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Debt Discharge Income: Kirby Lumber Co.
Revisited Under the "Transactional Equity"
Rule of Hillsboro*
Louis A. DEL COTTO**
Th e holding of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,'-that income
Sarises from the satisfaction of debt at less than its face amount-has
become riddled with exceptions and qualifications to the point where the
holding is, perhaps as often as not, found inapplicable to debt discharge
gain.' This article will investigate a problem which has the potential for
becoming a major exception to the holding of Kirby Lumber, the dis-
charge of debt the consideration for which did not increase debtor's as-
sets-such as debt issued in a corporate reorganization where bonds are
exchanged for stock-or debt for which no consideration whatsoever is
seen as having been received, such as bonds issued as a dividend on cor-
porate stock, or debt assumed by one person as a gift to another. As we
shall see, in all these examples it has been held that, viewing the entire
transaction, there was no gain and hence there was no income despite the
presence of a clear gain from the discharge of debt. Kirby Lumber was
limited to situations where asset value was increased by consideration
paid for the debt.
The position is taken here that such a limitation on the principle of
Kirby Lumber is improper whether Kirby Lumber is viewed strictly as
resting entirely on the "freeing of assets" principle, without regard to the
nature and amount of any consideration received for the discharged debt,
or whether it is viewed as requiring a look at the "transaction as a
whole," from the time the debt is issued to the time of its discharge, in an
attempt to find a gain or benefit to the debtor from the entire transaction.
*Copyright 0 1990, Louis A. Del Cotto. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. For valuable comments on this
topic, thanks to my colleague Kenneth F. Joyce, to my research assistant Douglas M. Secular, and to
my many students throughout the years.
1. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
2. See generally, BrrrKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXAmTON OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIwS
1 6.4 (2d ed. 1989)[hereinafter B.BI-rKER & L.LoKKEN]; Bittker & Thompson, Income From the
Discharge of Indebtednes: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CAL. L. REv. 1159
(1978)[hereinafter Bittker and Thompson].
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In the search for "gain" or "benefit," however, under the position taken
here the transactional approach as viewed by the decided cases has been
both limited-to prevent the taxpayer from enjoying impermissible
double benefits-and, at the same time, broadened, -to extend the
meaning of "benefit" beyond traditional notions which require enhance-
ment of asset value.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KIRBY LUMBER AND
KERBA UGH-EMPIRE
The principle of Kirby Lumber' is readily stated: if bonds are re-
deemed by a debtor at less than their issue price, the excess of the issue
price over the cost of repurchase is gross income to the debtor. In Kirby
Lumber, the Court stated the problem and the result:
In July 1923, the plaintiff, Kirby Lumber Company, issued its own
bonds for $12,126,800 for which it received their par value. Later in the
same year it purchased in the open market some of the same bonds at less
than par, the difference of price being $137,521.30. The question is whether
this difference is a taxable gain or income of the plaintiff for the year 1923.
4
The Court then applied the then applicable Treasury Regulation "If the
corporation purchases and retires any.., bonds at a price less than the
issuing price or face value, the excess of the issuing price or face value
over the purchase price is gain or income for the taxable year,"' and held
the $137,521.30 to be income:
As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets previously
offset by the obligation of the bonds now extinct .... The defendant in
error has realized within the year an accession to income, if we take words
in their plain popular meaning, as they should be taken here.
6
The Court distinguished Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,7 where the bor-
rowed funds had been lost in the debtor's business operations and no
income was found. But there, said the Court in Kirby Lumber, "The
transaction as a whole was a loss .... Here there was no shrinkage of
assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain. '
There is an apparent tension between the general principle applied
by the Court-the excess of issue price over repurchase price is income
3. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
4. 284 U.S. at 2.
5. 284 U.S. at 3. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12.
6. 284 U.S. at 3 citing Bumet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364 (1930).
7. 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
8. 284 U.S. at 3.
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(the so-called "freeing of assets rule")-and the Court's failure to repudi-
ate Kerbaugh-Empire which creates an exception to that principle where
"the transaction as a whole" shows no gain. This apparent approval by
the Court of the Kerbaugh-Empire case has led to the lower courts at-
tempting a reconciliation of the two cases, and to a dispute over what the
Court meant in using the term "issue price." Thus, where the bonds are
issued for non-cash consideration, such as the debtor's stock, or for no
consideration whatsoever, such as bonds issued as a dividend on the cor-
poration's stock, or where the original debtor's debt is assumed by an-
other in order to make a gift to the debtor, courts, in searching for
"income," or "gain", have gone beyond the freeing of assets principle of
Kirby Lumber and have searched the entire transaction to see whether
the net effect of the transaction viewed as a whole, produced a gain to the
debtor.
The tension between the "freeing of assets" principle-which looks
only to the year of the bond repurchase to find gain-and the transac-
tional approach-which looks at all years involved, from issuance of the
bonds to repurchase, as was done in Kerbaugh-Empire-was created
largely by the lower courts who, in applying Kirby Lumber, perceived it
as involving bonds issued for full cash consideration.9 In fact, as Profes-
sor Bittker has pointed out, 10 those bonds were issued in exchange for
taxpayer's preferred stock and in cancellation of dividend arrearages on
that stock. A problem arose because in Kirby Lumber the findings of the
trial court, the Court of Claims, were only that the company received
"par value."'1 This was raised in the Supreme Court by taxpayer's mo-
tion to remand to find the actual facts, "if the Court believes the consid-
eration received for the bonds is material . .. ,12 Although the
government originally asserted there had been cash consideration in its
petition for certiorari, both parties eventually agreed in their briefs that
the nature of the consideration was immaterial.13 Thus, the formal rec-
ord did not show that cash consideration was paid for the bonds and the
parties in effect stipulated to the Court that the nature of the considera-
tion was immaterial. Nowhere was it suggested that the value given was
not equal to the face amount of the bonds.
In light of the proceedings in the Supreme Court, the opinion in
9. See the full discussion of this point in Bittker, Income From Cancellation of Indebtedness: A
Historical Footnote To The Kirby Lumber Co. Case, 4 J. CORP. TAX 124 (1977)[hereinafter Bittker].
10. Id. at 126.
11. Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 44 F.2d 885 (Ct. C1. 1930), rev'd, 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
12. See, Bittker, supra note 9, at 127.
13. Id. at 127-28.
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Kirby Lumber is revealing. Nowhere does the Court say that the bonds
were issued for cash; the Court used the terms "par value," "face value"
(in quoting the Regulations) and "issuing price," (again in quoting the
regulations). These terms reveal nothing about the nature of the consid-
eration received, whether it was cash or preferred stock, although the
statement that the corporation issued bonds "for which it received their
par value" indicates the Court understood that whatever the considera-
tion was, its market value was equal to the face amount of the bonds.
Also, the "freeing of assets" principle itself-that the debt discharged
was greater than the repurchase price resulting in gain from freed as-
sets-is neutral on the point of consideration received since the freed
assets could consist of cash or other assets received for the bonds, or
simply the corporate assets unenhanced by consideration, if any, received
for the bonds.
Given the proceedings before the Court and the language of the
opinion, Professor Bittker concludes:
Having been argued by both parties on the premise that the nature of the
consideration received for the bonds was irrelevant (and on a record that
did not address itself to this issue), the case almost certainly was decided on
the same assumption.
14
Under this view, Kirby Lumber means simply that freeing of assets,
or balance sheet improvement through an increase in net worth, is in-
come irrespective of the nature of the consideration received (whether
appreciated preferred stock or cash), indeed whether any consideration
was received, and, if cash or property was received, the fact that it may
have been lost in business or used for personal consumption.
What has prevented Kirby Lumber from having such sweep is the
Court's apparent endorsement of the Kerbaugh-Empire principle. There,
the Court held that no income was realized by a corporate borrower
which repaid a loan in devalued German marks that cost less to purchase
in American dollars than the value of the marks received in the borrow-
ing. Noting that "the whole transaction was a loss", the Court said:
"The loss was less than it would have been if marks had not declined in
value but the mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit or income."
1Is
If Kirby Lumber had overruled or criticized Kerbaugh-Empire it
could be easily read as a "freeing of assets" case. Instead the Court con-
fused the issue by distinguishing Kerbaugh-Empire:
14. d.at 129. But see Gunn, Reconciling United States Steel and Kirby Lumber, 42 TAx NoTES
851, (1989).
15. 271 U.S. at 175.
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But the transaction as a whole was a loss.... Here there was no shrinkage
of assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain. As a result of its dealings it
made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of
[the] bonds now extinct.... The defendant in error has realized within the
year an accession to income .... 16
Here we have a curious blend of language which looks first to the
transaction as a whole, suggesting a transactional approach which would
look beyond the balance sheet gain from the debt discharge, and trace the
borrowed funds to determine whether there was an overall gain or loss.
Although the Court returns to the notion of freed assets it does so in the
context of there having been "no shrinkage of assets," again suggesting
the transactional approach. This suggestion, in turn, is clouded by the
Court's allusion to the annual accounting system in stating the income
was realized "within the year."17
And so we have this tension between the transactional approach
which looks at the entire borrowing transaction for an overall gain or
loss, and the freeing of asset theory which looks only at balance sheet
improvement in the year of debt discharge, disregarding any loss of the
borrowed funds, and indeed whether there was any amount at all re-
ceived through borrowing.
In 1954, as part of the overall enactment of the 1954 Internal Reve-
nue Code, Congress had the opportunity to address this tension. Instead
it merely enacted section 61(a)(12) which states simply that gross income
includes "Income from discharge of indebtedness," at the same time en-
acting the predecessors of sections 108 and 1017, which basically contain
certain definitional and relief provisions which depend on a judicial find-
ing of debt-discharge income in order to be operative. Nowhere has Con-
gress made a comprehensive attempt to define such income. Instead the
problem has been left to the courts.18
FREEING OF ASSETS: A VIABLE THEORY?
In Kerbaugh-Empire the Court refused to find income despite the
presence of freed assets arising from debt discharge. This, of course, is
the perceived conflict between the freed asset rule and the transactional
view. Given this conflict, is there an argument that the freeing of assets
16. 284 U.S. at 3.
17. See B.BrrrKER & L.LOKKEN, supra note 2, 1 6.4.1, at 6-31.
18. See B.BrrrKER & M.MCMAHON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALs, 4.4, at 4-13 (1st
ed. 1988); B.BrrrKER & L.LoKKEN supra note 2, 6.4.1, at 6-33 especially note 22.
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rule simpliciter should control the issue of debt discharge income, disre-
garding the transaction as a whole?
Certainly a forcible argument can be made that a balance sheet in-
crease in net worth, by itself and without regard to other factors or trans-
actions, as Justice Holmes expressed it in Kirby Lumber is ". .an
accession to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as
they should be taken here. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,.. ." The
cite to Sanford & Brooks is especially revealing since it is the leading case
affirming the annual accounting system and rejecting transactional ac-
counting on facts remarkably similar to those in Kerbaugh-Empire: in-
come from damages recovered for breach of contract could not be offset
by losses suffered in earlier years in performing the contract. 9
Is such a rule fair to the taxpayer? Arguably, yes because the rule
makes economic and tax sense. Relief from debt without asset depletion
makes available to the taxpayer assets previously burdened by-i.e., dedi-
cated to paying-the debt. If this increase in net worth is not, to para-
phrase Mr. Justice Holmes, in plain words an accession to wealth, what
is it? The fact that the borrowing was lost in business in a prior year as
in Kerbaugh-Empire, or that no cash or other asset was received for the
debt, even without regard to the Sanford & Brooks stress on the impor-
tance of the annual accounting system, is simply irrelevant to the eco-
nomic and tax fact that the debt discharge increases wealth at no cost to
the taxpayer.2 °
THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH
Another way to view the problem is that on the facts of Kerbaugh-
Empire, the holding of that case represents an improper application of
transactional accounting;21 that the transactional approach properly ap-
plied would give a Kirby Lumber taxable income result in Kerbaugh-Em-
pire itself.
The Supreme Court's recent encounter with transactional account-
ing occurred in Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner22 where a diary
19. See B.BrrrKER & L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, 6.4.1, at 6-31; 4 B.BrrTKER, FEDERAL TAXA-
"nON OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 105.1.4 (1st ed. 1981).
20. For the view that application of Kirby Lumber does not depend on the presence of a prior
tax benefit, such as a deduction, because the "freeing of assets" rule operates independently of the
tax benefit rule, see B.BrrrKER & L.LOKKEN, supra note 2, 1 6.4.5, at 6-55; Bittker and Thompson,
supra note 2, at 1179-1182.
21. Also, there is a view that Kerbaugh-Empire has been implicitly rejected by later Supreme
Court cases, see Vukasovich v. Commissioner, 790 F. 2d 1409, 1413-16 (9th Cir.1986).
22. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
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company deducted the entire cost of cattle feed and in the following year
distributed a substantial amount of the feed in liquidation. The issue
before the Court was whether the tax benefit rule required the corpora-
tion to take into income for the year of liquidation the value of the grain
distributed. The Commissioner argued that a "recovery" of a previously
deducted item was not required to invoke the tax benefit rule; that the
only requirement was an event "inconsistent" with the deduction. The
Court agreed, holding that the purpose of the tax benefit rule is not sim-
ply to tax "recoveries," but "to approximate the results produced by a
tax system based on transactional rather than annual accounting."23 In
other words to do "transactional equity."'24 Thus the tax benefit rule is
triggered when a later event is "fundamentally inconsistent with the
premise on which the deduction was initially based."2 5 Such inconsis-
tency was present because the deduction was premised on the assumption
the grain would earn income for the corporation by being consumed in
its business.
The notion behind a requirement of "transactional equity" in the
operation of the tax benefit rule seems to apply with equal force to the
area of debt discharge income. The clearest case for such application
would be Kirby Lumber itself if we assume the bonds had been sold for
cash at par value. In such case the result of Kirby Lumber would be
correct under both the freeing of assets theory and under the transac-
tional approach: since the borrowing was received tax free (was excluded
from gross income) on the assumption all of it would be repaid,26 failure
to repay is fundamentally inconsistent with the premise of the prior ex-
clusion from gross income, and the portion of debt forgiven is income.
Thus the "transactional equity" notion of the tax benefit rule is ex-
panded to reach debt forgiveness where such forgiveness is inconsistent
with a past benefit-in Kirby Lumber the exclusion from gross income of
the borrowing-in order to do equity for the Government. Of course,
Hillsboro itself involved a prior deduction rather than an exclusion. We
could view the exclusion for the borrowing as a combination of a contem-
poraneous inclusion and an accrued deduction so that it fits literally
within the Hillsboro rationale. Such reconstruction is not necessary,
however, under the view here proposed, to wit, that the "transactional
23. 460 U.S. at 381.
24. See 460 U.S. at 377.
25. 460 U.S. at 383.
26. The presence of the offsetting liability is usually cited as the reason for the exclusion from
income; that is restated here as an assumption that the borrowing will be repaid. See B.BrrrKER &
L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, 6.4.1, at 6-31 to 6-32.
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equity" principle of the tax benefit rule should apply in all cases where
transactional equity is to be done: that is, in order to prevent all impermis-
sible double benefits.' A borrowing excluded from gross income coupled
with failure to tax freed assets arising from later forgiveness of the debt
would clearly be a double exclusion and an impermissible double tax
benefit.
Although such a rule appears inconsistent with the annual account-
ing principle of Sanford & Brooks, it is a long standing exception to that
principle in applying the tax benefit rule, which has always looked back
at the entire transaction to find a recovery, and now under Hillsboro, to
do transactional equity without regard to a recovery. The proposal made
here is simply to expand the transactional approach beyond deduction
transactions to debt discharge transactions in order to do equity and
achieve fairness. Indeed, just such an application of the tax benefit rule is
illustrated by I.R.C. § 1001. The gain from the sale of property is not
measured merely by the amount received in the year of sale; rather the
entire transaction is taken into account including the cost of the property
upon acquisition, capital improvements to the property and depreciation
deductions, all in order to reduce such amount realized by the remaining
investment in the property. Not to do so would result in a tax on capital
rather than income; an unfair and improper double tax; the second tax
being inconsistent with the prior tax on the investment."3
KERBAUGH-EMPIRE: THE TRANSACTIONAL VIEW MISAPPLIED
The Kerbaugh-Empire case neatly illustrates how the transactional
approach can be misused to allow an impermissible double benefit. As-
sume that the corporation borrows $100, loses that amount in the opera-
tion of its business and in a later year discharges the $100 debt for $75.
Under Kerbaugh-Empire it would be held that "the mere diminution of
loss is not gain, profit or income," i.e., that the $25 debt discharge gain
arising from the freeing of assets merely diminishes the business losses
from $100 down to $75, and therefore is not a gain.
This analysis gives rise to a number of difficulties. First of all, in
27. See generally, Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and Transactional Consistency Under The
Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAx L. REV. 473 (1984).
28. See, Gunn, Reconciling United States Steel and Kirby Lumber, 42 TAX NoTES 851, 853
(1989). Compare B.BrrrxER & L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, % 6.4.5, at 6-55 for the view that Kirby
Lumber's application does not depend on the presence of prior tax benefit. See also, supra note 20.
This article sees the "transactional equity" rule of Hillsboro as broadening the tax benefit rule to
encompass such prior benefits as personal consumption. See discussion of Bradford v. Commissioner,
233 F. 2d 935 (6th Cir.1956), infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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Kerbaugh-Empire, the cash borrowed was traced to a particular pro-
ject,2 9 which is not typical since ordinarily borrowed cash makes avail-
able other cash funds which can finance other projects. Thus the
"transaction as a whole" would require a look not only to projects di-
rectly financed with the borrowing, but also to those indirectly fi-
nanced.30 This tracing problem could be avoided if the transactional
approach were bottomed on a theory that the very fact of a decline in
value of the taxpayer's bonds, whether due to a rise in interest rates or
the financial instability of the debtor, demonstrates a decline in the
debtor's going concern value which would offset the gain from debt dis-
charge.31 The holding of Kirby Lumber, however, would reject such a
broadening of the transactional view.32
If the taxability of the debt discharge income is linked to the loss of
the borrowed funds there is also the problem of giving a double tax bene-
fit for a single loss. In the above example, the $100 loss gives a double
benefit to the extent of $25 since the $100 is deducted as business expense
under I.R.C. section 162 (or as a business loss under section 165) and
also gives rise to an exclusion from gross income.3 3 Thus the $100 loss
generates $125 of tax benefits (and could generate as much as $200 if the
debt had been settled for $0), whereas under any sensible application of a
transactional approach the net loss from the entire transaction should be
only $75. It seems clear that the Kerbaugh-Empire view of the transac-
tional method violates the express holding of Hillsboro that a deduction
and later exclusion of the same item are fundamentally inconsistent be-
cause an impermissible double benefit is allowed. Another way to view
the analysis is that the $100 loss deduction fully depletes all basis in the
borrowed funds, leaving no basis to offset the $25 of debt discharge in-
come. Under Hillsboro, a second use of the same basis would be funda-
mentally inconsistent.34 Similarly, if the borrowing is consumed in a
non-deductible manner then such consumption should be viewed as a
benefit which depletes all basis in the borrowed funds. A second use of
29. 271 U.S. at 171-173.
30. See B.BrrrKER '& L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, 6.4.1, at 6-29.
31. See B.BrrrKER & L.LoKICEN, supra note 2, 6.4.1, at 6-30.
32. Id.
33. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1163; B.BrrrKER & L.LOKcEN, supra note 2, t
6.4.1, at 6-29 (especially note 12), indicating it is not clear whether a double benefit was in fact
allowed in the actual Kerbaugh-Empire case.
34. See generally, Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and Transactional Consistency Under the
Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAx L. REv. 473, 488 (1984).
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that basis against the debt discharge gain would, under Hillsboro, be an
impermissible double benefit.
THE TRANSACTIONAL VIEW AND PERSONAL CONSUMPTION:
THE BRADFORD CASE
In Bradford v. Commissioner,35 Mr. Bradford, a member of a bro-
kerage firm with a seat on the New York Stock Exchange, owed a long-
standing business debt to a bank. Because of his fears that the Exchange
would frown on the amount of debt he was carrying, in 1938 the bank
agreed to release him from an unsecured portion of the debt in the
amount of $100,000 in return for his wife's note in the same amount.
Some years later, in 1946, after bank examiners required the bank to
write the value of the note down to $50,000, she was able to discharge it
by paying $50,000 to the bank. The Commissioner contended she had
income of $50,000 under the "freeing of assets" rule of Kirby Lumber
and that view prevailed in the Tax Court.36 The Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged the general rule of annual accounting under Sanford &
Brooks, but refused a "mechanical application" of that principle, relying
on Kerbaugh-Empire:
The Kerbaugh-Empire Co., case was decided before the Kirby Lumber
Co., and Sanford & Brooks Co., decisions. The case has been called "a fre-
quently criticized and not easily understood decision." It is nonetheless a
decision which has not been overruled. Whatever validity the.., decision
may now have on its own facts, it remains an authority for the proposition
that in deciding the income tax effect of cancellation of indebtedness for less
than its face amount, a court need not in every case be oblivious to the net
effect of the entire transaction .... 37
The fact is that by any realistic standard the petitioner never realized
any income at all from the transaction in issue. In 1938 "without receiving
any consideration in return," she promised to pay a prior debt of her hus-
band's. In a later year she paid part of that debt for less than its face value.
Had she paid $50,000 in 1938 to discharge $100,000 of her husband's in-
debtedness, the Commissioner could hardly contend that she thereby real-
ized income. Yet the net effect of what she did was precisely the same. We
cannot agree that the transaction resulted in taxable income to her.
38
The Court also relied on Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co.,39 where a
corporation which issued its own bonds as a dividend to its shareholders
35. 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir.1956).
36. 22 T.C. 1057 (1954).
37. 233 F.2d at 938-939 (citations omitted).
38. 233 F.2d at 938 (citation omitted).
39. 61 F.2d 751, (2nd Cir.1932).
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and subsequently redeemed some of the bonds at less than face value was
held to have no income:
Stripped of superficial distinctions, the Rail Joint Co. case is identical in
principle with the present case. In that case, as in this, the taxpayer re-
ceived nothing of value when the indebtedness was assumed. Although the
indebtedness was discharged at less than its face value, the taxpayer was in
fact poorer by virtue of the entire transaction ...4
The Court in attempting to find the "net effect of the entire transac-
tion" said it was the same as if in 1938 she had paid off her husband's
$100,000 note for $50,000. If such were the case, it would be correct to
say that the transaction results in no income to her because a gift is not
an event taxable to the transferor.41 In such case it would be her hus-
band who received $50,000 of debt discharge income since the transac-
tion should be treated as if he received a non-taxable gift from Ms.
Bradford of $50,000, and used that money to discharge his $100,000 debt
to the bank. But none of this is what happened; it was not her husband's
$100,000 note that was discharged by Ms. Bradford for $50,000 in 1938;
the pertinent discharge occurred in 1946 when the bank took $50,000 in
discharge of her own $100,000 note which the bank had taken in dis-
charge of the husband's original note in 1938. Thus a $100,000 gift to
her husband was made by her in 1938 when she assumed his liability of
$100,000. There was no debt discharge income resulting from that trans-
action. The later discharge in 1946 of her $100,000 note for $50,000
resulted in a freeing of her assets, not his.42
Although that analogy made by the Court seems to miss the mark,
the result achieved arguably is supported by the Rail Joint case, as the
Court notes. In Rail Joint, the rationale for finding no income was that
in issuing the bond dividend the corporation "never received any incre-
ment to its assets,"'43 and hence gained nothing from the transaction as a
whole. The Bradford Court found that the taxpayer "received nothing of
value" for the indebtedness, and that the taxpayer was "in fact poorer by
virtue of the entire transaction." Hence there was no gain from the
transaction as a whole.
40. 233 F.2d at 939.
41. Compare Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F. 2d 331 C.A. 5 (1954), and I.R.C. § 84. Compare also
I.R.C. § 108(e)(4): if instead of discharging the note she had acquired from the bank for $50,000 her
husband's $100,000 note, the purchase would be treated as made by the husband, giving him $50,000
of debt discharge income at the time of her purchase. See B.BrrrcR & L.LoKKEN, supra note 2,
6.4.3, at 6-47 to 6-48.
42. Cf. B.BrrKER & L.SToNE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 127 (5th 1980).
43. 61 F.2d at 752.
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It is submitted that this view of economic and tax effects in Bradford
overlooks the fact that Ms. Bradford, in 1938, by making a gift to her
husband of $100,000, engaged in an act of personal consumption from
which she derived the benefit (presumably) of receiving satisfaction and
gratification, not to mention the fact that she was probably improving or
at least protecting, the family's economic condition by taking the debt off
her husband's balance sheet. This gift, hypothetically, could have been
made to him by Ms. Bradford directly borrowing $100,000 from the
bank and giving it to her husband to pay his debt, or by paying the
$100,000 directly to the lender-bank in discharge of his debt. Either way,
the rationale of Rail Joint requiring an "increment" to her assets, and of
Bradford that she receive value for the debt, would have clearly been
met.
Although there was no apparent direct borrowing, in terms of the
tax law Ms. Bradford did have an implicit borrowing with which she
paid her husband's debt. The self-imposed debt was an exercise of her
power to create real economic wealth and transfer it to her husband. In
order to transfer this wealth, necessarily she implicitly received it by way
of a borrowing which was excluded from her gross income because of the
obligation to repay.' Failure to repay thus is a taxable event under the
view of transactional equity. Indeed, if at the time of the gift it could be
known that she would not repay, a tax could then be imposed on the
implicit borrowing to the extent the debt would be forgiven. 45 Thus, a
broad view of transactional equity would also find income of $50,000
because failure to repay $100,000 was inconsistent with the "benefit" de-
rived from making the prior $100,000 gift. Or, using the similar "net
effect" approach, if the actual transaction in Bradford is viewed as having
44. See Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948) where a
bank paid as a dividend in kind to its shareholders certain notes it had deducted as worthless bad
debts, and was held taxable on the later collection by the shareholders on the notes:
Even though the bank never received the money, it derived money's worth from the
disposition of notes which it used in place of money in procuring a satisfaction that was
procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's worth. The enjoyment of the
economic benefit was realized as completely as it would have been if the bank had col-
lected the notes in dollars and cents and paid the money as a dividend to its sharehold-
ers. To say that a bank, which has declared a dividend in kind consisting of notes
representing interest or earnings, subsequently paid to its shareholders, has not realized
the fruits of its investment or labor, because it has assigned the notes instead of collecting
them itself and then paying the proceeds over to its shareholders, "is to affront common
understanding and to deny the facts of common experience. Common understanding
and experience are the touchstones for the interpretation of the revenue laws."
Id. at 1009 (citing to Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117-118).
45. See B.BrrrKER & L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, 1 6.4.1, at 6-32.
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the same economic effect as the hypothetical transaction where she bor-
rowed directly to pay his debt, then there should have been debt dis-
charge income under Kirby Lumber, using either the transactional view
or the freed assets rule. Having the same economic effect, the transac-
tions should have the same tax effect because the difference in form
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the substance is the same:
in both the actual Bradford transaction and the restructured alternative
there is the same net effect because in each situation when the year 1938
transaction is done, Ms. Bradford is left with no additional cash, but has
had only the personal and familial satisfaction of making a gift to her
husband, and she owes a debt of $100,000 to the bank. It matters not
whether the debt was incurred by an actual direct borrowing of funds or
by being an indirect borrowing through substitution as debtor for funds
originally borrowed by her husband, the economic effect to all parties is
identical. Therefore, the tax result should be the same."
Indeed, there is another and very practical argument for this result.
Since Ms. Bradford was dealing with the same bank as held her hus-
band's debt, had she requested a direct loan of $100,000 to pay that debt,
undoubtedly a substitution of her note for her husband's would have
been done instead. Why would the bank hand her $100,000 cash in order
for her to hand it right back together with her note? And if she had to
raise the cash by taking a direct loan from a different bank, the later
discharge would clearly produce income. On its facts should Bradford
apply to produce no income despite the economic equivalence of the
transactions? Despite the factual differences being purely formal, and
arising only from happenstance?
Looking at this problem from the viewpoint of basis, as was done
with Kerbaugh-Empire, Ms. Bradford's cost basis in the borrowed funds
(whether actually or constructively borrowed) was fully depleted by her
act of personal consumption in making the gift to her husband. Even
lacking deductibility, personal consumption as much as the business de-
duction in Kerbaugh-Empire, causes loss of basis in the asset consumed
leaving no basis to offset the later debt discharge income under the ap-
proach of Kerbaugh-Empire.
CORPORATE CONSUMPTION: THE RAIL JOINT PROBLEM
The Rail Joint case, upon which Bradford relied, was decided less
than a year after the decision of the Court in Kirby Lumber. In Rail
46. Id. 6.4.2, at 6-35, note 27.
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Joint the corporation declared and paid a dividend in its own bonds out
of a reevaluation surplus. Some years later, certain of these bonds were
redeemed at less than face value. The Court refused to find a taxable
gain on the debt discharged, distinguishing Kirby Lumber as a cash con-
sideration case:
In the Kirby Case a corporation issued its bonds at par and later in the
same year repurchased some of them at less than par. It was held that the
sum thus saved was taxable income. The taxpayer's assets were increased
by the cash received for the bonds, and, when the bonds were paid off for
less than the sum received, it is clear that the taxpayer obtained a net gain
in assets from the transaction. The cost of the money acquired by issuing
the bond was decreased when the bond was retired at less than the issuing
price. In other words, the consideration received for the obligation evi-
denced by the bond as well as the consideration paid to satisfy that obliga-
tion must be looked to in order to determine whether gain or loss is realized
when the transaction is closed, i.e., when the bond is retired....
But that decision is not applicable to the case at bar. In paying divi-
dends to shareholders, the corporation does not buy property from them.
Here the respondent never received any increment to its assets, either at the
time the bonds were delivered or at the time they were retired. They were
issued against a surplus created by reappraising assets already owned; and
no one suggests that in writing up the book value of property which had
appreciated the corporation received anything. The bonds were merely a
way of distributing a part of such surplus among shareholders. When cer-
tain of the bonds were retired at less than par, all that happened was that
the corporation retained a part of the surplus it had expected to distribute,
because it paid those shareholders whose bonds were redeemed at a dis-
count, less than it had promised to pay them. Hence it is apparent that the
corporation received no asset which it did not possess prior to the opening
and closing of the bond transaction, and it is impossible to see wherein it
has realized any taxable income. In such circumstances the Kirby Case
cannot be regarded as controlling.
It is true that the purchase and retirement of the bonds.., resulted in
decreasing the corporation's liabilities without a corresponding decrease in
its assets, and the petitioner contends that the difference should be deemed
income.... But it is not universally true that by discharging a liability for
less than its face the debtor necessarily receives a taxable gain ... Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-Empire.... This may be demonstrated by a simple illustra-
tion: Suppose that a taxpayer validly contracts in 1930 to give $1,000 to a
charity in 1931, and in the latter year compromises the obligation by paying
$500 in full settlement. If the taxpayer returns his income on a cash basis,
this transaction cannot possibly increase his income. The giving of the obli-
gation certainly added nothing to income in 1930, and the payment of it in
1931 will appear only as a deduction of the sum actually paid in that year to
the use of a charitable corporation. If he were to report on an accrual basis
and were allowed to deduct from gross income for 1930 the $1,000 liability
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incurred in that year, then it might be said that the settlement of the liabil-
ity in 1931 for a less sum had released the difference to the general uses of
the taxpayer and the sum so released should appear as income then received
in order that the returns for both years might truly reflect the effect of the
whole transaction upon the net income. But... the dividend obligation
evidenced by the bonds was not a liability deductible from gross income.
Here neither the amount written up to surplus nor the bonds issued against
it had ever been deducted from gross income for taxation purposes. Hence
the entries in the surplus account are only bookkeeping entries, and do not
reflect a realized taxable gain.a7
The reasoning of the opinion in Rail Joint Co. is questionable. The
first leg of the opinion assumes that the Kirby Lumber bonds were issued
for cash consideration, facts which were not in evidence in Kirby Lum-
ber, and which arguably, as discussed above, the Supreme Court itself
was careful not to rely upon. The second leg relies on the charitable
pledge illustration which, although properly analyzed, is simply irrele-
vant to the decision. The reason why the cash method pledger in the
illustration has no debt discharge income is the same as for the presence
in the Code of section 108(e)(2):48 the debt discharged, if paid, would
have been deductible. The only tax consequence of non-payment is loss
of the tax deduction to that extent.49 Thus, in the illustration, the year
1931 deduction is reduced to $500, which gives the same tax effect as if
the full $1,000 had been paid in 1931 and $500 had then been returned to
the pledger by the charity. The 1931 deduction would be $1,000, but
gross income would also be increased by $500. Extension by the court of
the illustration to the accrual method pledger simply illustrates the flip
side of § 108(e)(2): since payment of the pledge would not be deductible,
the debt discharged should be income. And it would be income under
the tax benefit rule. The $1,000 deduction taken in 1930 is conditioned
on payment of the full amount being made in 1931. A 1931 payment of
only $500 is fundamentally inconsistent with the premise of the 1930
deduction to the extent of the unpaid portion, and so $500 must be in-
cluded in 1931 to achieve transactional consistency (as is clearly noted by
the opinion in Rail Joint.)
What is the importance of the § 108(e)(2) principle to the Rail Joint
problem? If the bonds had given rise to a deduction for the face amount
47. 61 F.2d at 751-752.
48. I.R.C. § 108(e)(2) provides: "No income shall be realized from the discharge of indebted-
ness to the extent that payment of the liability would have given rise to a deduction."
49. See B.BrrrKER & L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, 6.4.2, at 6-41.
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on issue,"0 then, as with the accrual method pledger in the illustration,
failure to pay the face amount on redemption would give rise to income
under the tax benefit rule for the unpaid portion. If, on the other hand,
payment of the bond principal was tax deductible, than failure to pay the
full face value on redemption would not give rise to income under the
principle of § 108(e)(2). But Rail Joint falls under neither hypothesis
since the bonds were deductible neither when issued (as noted by the
court),51 nor when paid on redemption. Therefore § 108(e)(2), as with
the cash method pledger in the illustration, does not prevent the debt
discharge from being income. Nor, on the other hand, does a traditional
view of the tax benefit rule require a finding of income because, arguably,
the discharge of debt on the redemption of the bonds is not an event
inconsistent with a prior year's tax benefit. Although not so stated by the
opinion in Rail Joint, the thrust of the holding seems to be that discharge
of a non-deductible debt is not income under § 108(e)(2) without the
presence of some prior tax benefit, such as an exclusion for a cash bor-
rowing received on the issuance of the bonds, as the Court assumed was
the case in Kirby Lumber. Put slightly differently, the Rail Joint court
rested its decision on the fact that the corporate taxpayer received no
increment in its assets as consideration for issuing the dividend bonds.
The effect of the Court's no income holding is to rely on the absence of
any economic benefit (no funds were received so there was no addition to
assets) or tax benefit (by way of a deduction on the issuance of the
bonds), despite the acknowledged gain present under the freeing of assets
theory.
There are a number of responses to the doctrine of Rail Joint. Since
the facts resemble Bradford, some of the responses will be somewhat sim-
ilar to the Bradford responses, but with a corporate twist. First, the deal
can be restructured to provide an economic and tax benefit. Simply have
the corporation sell the bonds for cash in the face amount of the bonds
and pay the cash as a dividend. 2 So viewed, as stated by Professors
Bittker and Lokken, "the bonds gave the distributing corporation the
same corporate benefits as a distribution of cash, and a later discharge of
50. See the taxpayer's position in Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.
1969); cf. I.R.C. § 461(h); I.R.C. §§ 1272, 163(e).
51. IR.C. § 162(k).
52. See B.BrrrKER & L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, % 6.4.2, at 6-35; But see Gunn, Reconciling
United States Steel and Kirby Lumber, 42 TAx NoTEs 851, 852 n.10 (1989), arguing that the anal-
ogy is misleading because the transaction presented shifts wealth from outsiders (bond purchasers)
to the corporation and its shareholders as a group, whereas in the actual transaction no outsiders
were involved at all.
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the bonds for less than this amount should have been taxed in the same
way as a redemption of bonds issued for cash."53 The argument seems to
be that the corporation has received the corporate benefits of paying a
cash dividend after a sale of the bonds for cash. Thus, as in Bradford,
there is an implicit borrowing of cash which is used to pay the dividend.
The benefits of paying a dividend are the same, therefore, whether it is
paid in cash or bonds, and the tax result should be the same. Under the
transactional method, there is debt discharge income.5 4
53. B.BrrKER & L.LoKKEN, supra note 2, 6.4.2, at 6-35.
54. The "corporate benefits" arguably arise because the declaration and payment of the divi-
dend whether in cash or bonds is "corporate consumption," L., the corporate equivalent of an act of
"personal consumption," very much akin to the gift made by wife to husband in assuming his liabil-
ity in Bradford. Like that gift, the dividend is an implied borrowing the distribution of which gives
rise to corporate satisfaction and gratification arising from the business necessity of providing a
shareholder return on investment, not only to keep shareholders content, but in order to have share-
holders at all:
Typically, corporations over the long haul will pay out less than all their earnings as
dividends. A portion of earnings will be retained and reinvested in the business. But all
that the shareholders see is the dividend. That is their return. It is now widely accepted
in the sophisticated academic financial literature that the value of shares of common
stock is best thought of as a function of the dividends (including any final, liquidating
dividend paid when the corporation's existence ends) that the corporation can be ex-
pected to pay out over its life. Many people consider this to be a peculiar proposition
because they think instinctively about capital gain (sale price less cost) as part of the
return on common stock.
The fact is, nonetheless, that capital gain must be a function of expectations about
future dividends. Imagine a series of shareholders. The first shareholder pays a given
amount for the shares, based on an estimate of the amount of cash dividends plus a gain
(or loss) at some time in the future. The next shareholder makes the same kind of calcu-
lation. That is, the gain, if any, will depend on the next shareholder's expectation as to
cash dividends plus capital gain (or loss). And so on. If we think of the entire series of
shareholders, some may have greater capital gains or losses than others, depending on
the timing of their purchases and sales and on collective expectations, reflected in market
prices, at the time of those purchases and sales. But the gains and losses are transfers
among all the shareholders who hold the shares over the entire time that they are out-
standing. Those gains or losses do not increase or decrease the total return on the shares
over that time. The only return that shareholders collectively can expect over the life of
the shares in which they invest is the dividends (including, as indicated above, any final
or liquidating dividend) paid on those shares. It can be seen, then, that if people are
rational the value of the shares at any point in time must be derived solely from the
series of expectations about dividends. Any gain in the value of shares must be based on
expectations concerning dividends to be paid at some point in the future.
To see the same point from a different perspective, suppose that someone offered to
sell you some shares of stock and that you were certain that the corporation would
never, ever pay any dividends (including disguised dividends in the form of an excessive
salary or the like) or any proceeds from liquidation or other distributions. You would be
foolish to pay anything at all for those shares. And if you did buy them, you would have
to find an equal fool to buy them from you at your cost and a greater fool to buy them
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The same idea expressed in this argument is also reflected in the
"net effect" argument made above with respect to the reconstruction of
events in Bradford to assume an actual direct borrowing and a gift of
cash: the corporation is in the exact same position from an economic
point of view as if it had sold the bonds and paid a cash dividend. At the
end of the dividend transaction it is left with no cash or assets additional
to what it had before the transaction, with a debt to its shareholders in
from you at a gain to you. The only thing that makes shares valuable is the expectation
of payments of some sort at some time in the future.
This does not mean that the shares of a corporation that pays no dividends currently
are worthless. Many companies have operated for years without paying dividends.
Many of these have been successful, growing companies that were retaining all of their
earnings in order to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. People do,
rationally, pay money for shares of such companies. They do so because they expect
that at some point in the future dividends will be paid.
W.KLEIN AND J.CoFFEE, BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRIN-
CIPLES, 251-252 (4th ed.1990).
A similar view was presented in Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F. 2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1948) where a bank paid as a dividend in kind to its shareholders certain notes it had
charged off as worthless. The bank was held taxable on amounts later collected by the shareholders
on the notes:
The avoidance of taxes may be perfectly legitimate, but it cannot be done by the
anticipatory assignment of notes representing income, as a dividend in kind, and the
subsequent collection of said notes by the assignees. The respondent is a banking corpo-
ration, organized and operated for profit. The acquisition of profits for its shareholders
was the purpose of its creation. The collection of interest on loans was a principal source
of its income. The payment of dividends to its shareholders was the enjoyment of its
income. A body corporate can be said to enjoy its income in no other way. Like the
"life-rendering pelican" it feeds its shareholders upon dividends. Whether they are in
the form of notes or money is immaterial if the dividend is from earnings .... The
respondent exercised its power to procure payment of its income to another, which was
"the enjoyment, and hence the realization," of its income. (at 1009).
See also Rudco Oil and Gas v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (1949), where a family corporation
with a cash position justifying a dividend temporarily transferred certain leases to its shareholders
until they collected a stated amount of rentals at which time the shareholders reconveyed the leases.
The shareholders' receipts were held to be income to the corporation (and a dividend to the share-
holders), the corporate conveyance being merely "the assignment of future income to satisfy a moral
and near-legal obligation of the assignor..... Id. at 751.
See also I.R.C. § 312(a)(2) which allows a corporation's earnings and profits account to be re-
duced by the principal amount of its own obligations distributed as a dividend.
"Assume a corporation distributes a $100 bond as a dividend, and sometime later,
after interest rates have risen, the corporation redeems the bond for $80. The corpora-
tion is out of pocket $80, but its earnings and profits have been reduced by $100. If $20
of discharge of indebtedness income is recognized on the redemption, however, this in-
come generates additional earnings and profits that square the earnings and profits ac-
count with the economics of the transaction. The earnings and profits rule, in other
words, implies that discharge of indebtedness is recognized on a repurchase at less than
face of a bond distributed as a dividend.
B.BrITKER & L.LOKxEN, supra note 2, at % 6.42,6-35.
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the face amount of the bonds, and with the corporate satisfaction of hav-
ing paid a dividend to its shareholders. Since the net effect, or economic
effect of the two transactions is the same, the tax results for both transac-
tions should be controlled by the cash dividend example.
Returning to I.R.C. section 108(e)(2) (discharge of a debt, payment
of which would be deductible, is not income), the negative implication of
this section is that the debt discharge in Rail Joint is income because
payment of the amount of discharge would not have been deductible.
The presence of income despite lack of a deduction anywhere in the
transaction, which as noted above proved a stumbling block for the court
in Rail Joint, is explained by the fact that the bond dividend payment is
an act of corporate consumption as much as the gift in Bradford was an
act of personal consumption. The benefit of this consumption, or the
implicit borrowing which is "distributed" as a dividend, gives rise to an
exclusion which is conditioned on repayment of the borrowing, as we
have seen. From the viewpoint of basis, the consumption depletes the
corporation's basis in earnings and profits as much as if the dividend had
been paid in cash. Thus, the act of consumption depletes basis in the
item consumed (the amount borrowed by the wife in Bradford and the
corporate earnings in an amount equal to the face amount of the bonds in
Rail Joint), just as did the business loss deduction in Kerbaugh-Empire.
Some may argue that the imposition of a tax on the debt discharge
gain in Rail Joint is really a tax on capital rather than income because it
is a second tax on the same money - i.e., a tax on wealth which has
already been taxed as corporate operating profits. But this argument
should not succeed. Once the operating profits are allocated to the bond
dividend, as discussed above, basis is lost due to corporate consumption.
When the profits are unburdened by the debt discharge they in effect
become a receipt against which there is no basis offset. In other words
their character as tax-paid capital is lost due to loss of basis, or "tax-
cost", and when unburdened by the debt discharge become income a sec-
ond time.
In one respect Rail Joint is somewhat dissimilar to Bradford in that
the rule of Rail Joint gives to the corporation an option either to sell
bonds and pay a cash dividend, or to pay the dividend with bonds in
kind. Especially in a rising interest market, declaring the bond dividend
is similar to selling short in that less cash will eventually be paid on prin-
cipal than was promised. And the shareholders are not necessarily disad-
vantaged because bonds of public corporations are easily marketable and
can quickly be converted to cash. This creates a great potential for the
1990]
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business community to exploit the fisc, even though the tax advantage
present is not given to the economically identical cash dividend paid
from the proceeds of a bond sale. And for those corporations who are
not fully advised, there is also the proverbial "trap for the unwary."
Again in the corporate setting we have the cases of Fashion Park,
Inc. v. Commissioner5 and United States Steel Corporation v. The United
States.56 In Fashion Park, in a tax-free reorganization, bonds with a face
value of $50 were exchanged for preferred stock which had cost $5 a
share in order to replace the preferred stock with a security carrying a
less burdensome dividend or rate of interest. The bonds were eventually
redeemed for a price in excess of $5. The Tax Court found there was no
debt discharge income because the corporation did not receive more than
the $5 originally paid for the preferred stock so that the transaction as a
whole gave it no gain. Kirby Lumber was rejected as a case where full
value had been received for the bonds so that less was paid out in assets
than had been received for the bonds. Rail Joint was relied upon and
found properly to distinguish Kirby Lumber.
In United States Steel Corp., a similar case, in 1901 preferred stock
had been issued for an assumed price of $100 per share. In 1966, in a
tax-free merger, U.S. Steel exchanged a $175 face value debenture for
each share of the preferred stock, the value of the bonds and the pre-
ferred stock being $165 each. In 1972 some of the bonds were redeemed
at $118 per bond. The Claims Court found debt discharge income of $47
per bond ($165 issue price less $118 repurchase price). It rejected a gain
of $57 per bond ($175 par value less $118) under Kirby Lumber, finding
that, under the rationale of Professor Bittker's article57 disclosing that
the Kirby Lumber bonds were not issued for cash but for preferred stock,
and dividend arrearages, the issue price of the bonds was the fair market
value of the consideration received. In Kirby Lumber that value was as-
sumed both by the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court to be the par
value of the bonds received in exchange. In U.S. Steel, that value was
less than the par value of the bonds, so the $165 market value of the
preferred rather than par value of $175 was held to be the issue price.
The Claims Court rejected Rail Joint and Fashion Park, which would
have found income only if the repurchase price of the bonds had been
55. 21 T.C. 600 (1954).
56. 11 Cl. Ct. 375 (1986), motion for reconsideration granted in part, 11 CI. Ct. 541 (1987),
rev'd, 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir.1988).
57. 11 C1.Ct. 375 at 379, 385, relying on Bittker, supra note 9.
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below the $100 cost of the preferred.5"
The Claims Court reading of Kirby Lumber is defensible. The
Supreme Court, as noted by Professor Bittker, seems not to-have as-
sumed a cash consideration and that the only pertinent factor was that
full value had been received whether or not that value increased the assets
of the corporation. So viewed, Kirby Lumber in fact supports the holding
of the Claims Court in U.S. Steel, that the issue price was the value of the
preferred stock received in consideration of the bond transferred, despite
the fact that no additional asset value accrued to the corporation from
such consideration.5 9
Under the Claims Court reading of Kirby Lumber, the facts in U.S.
Steel and Fashion Park are clearly controlled by the Kirby Lumber hold-
ing, and, under that reading the Court of Appeals in U.S. Steel should
have affirmed the Claims Court. Instead the lower Court's decision was
reversed, the Court of Appeals stating:
Kirby Lumber sheds little light of the question before us regarding the
"issue price" of the... debentures. In Kirby Lumber, the Court stated that
the corporation had received the par value of the bonds upon their issuance,
which therefore was their issue price. The question in Kirby Lumber was
whether, upon repurchase of the bonds for less than their issue price, the
corporation realized taxable income. In contrast, the issue in the present
case is whether the issue price of the debentures was the market value of the
preferred stock at the time it was exchanged for the debentures or the
amount the company received when the stock originally was issued.6°
The Court of Appeals then relied on Fashion Park and Rail Joint
that "the critical inquiry is whether the effect of the cancellation is to
increase the corporation's assets" and in applying that standard the issue
price of the debentures "was the amount the company received when it
originally issued the preferred stock in 1901 and not the market value of
the preferred when the debentures were issued in exchange for the stock
in 1966.
''61
In applying the methodology of the transactional view in United
States Steel, the Court adopts the same view as Rail Joint, Fashion Park
58. 11 CI.Ct. 375 at 381-382.
59. Cf. Gunn, Reconciling United States Steel and Kirby Lumber, 42 TAX NOTES 851 (1989)
together with Shakow, United States Steel and Kirby Lumber: Another View, 42 TAX NOTES 1371
(1989). Cf., also Gunn, United States Steel And The Functional Approach To Legal Problems, 43
TAX NOTES 213 (1989); Shakow, A Short Retort on United States Steel, 43 TAX NOTES 1173 (1989);
Gunn, Gunn's Reply, 43 TAX NOTES 1174 (1989); Pisem, More on United States Steel Corporation,
43 TAX NOTES 1414 (1989).
60. 848 F.2d at 1234-1235.
61. 848 F.2d at 1236.
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and Bradford, and looks for an increase in asset value as consideration
for the bonds, disregarding the business and economic benefits of doing a
desired nontaxable reorganization to get rid of dividend arrearages as in
Kirby Lumber and Fashion Park, or to obtain the tax advantages of an
interest deduction instead of paying non-deductible dividends, as sug-
gested by the Court of Appeals in United States Steel in response to a
Government argument that seemed to confuse market value with par
value. 2 Not only are corporate consumption benefits ignored; also disre-
garded is the point made above with respect to zero basis for the corpo-
rate earnings unburdened by the debt discharge. And, of course, it




After the decision in Kirby Lumber, the lower courts held that in-
come from debt forgiveness had to be supported by an increase in assets
received in consideration for the debt. This result was felt to be required
by a proper reading of Kerbaugh-Empire, seemingly approved by Kirby
Lumber in viewing the "transaction as a whole." This view, however, if
too broadly applied could permit an improper double benefit; also, it
overlooks the fact that value or benefit arises from the implicit borrowing
inherent in consumption, whether it be personal or corporate consump-
tion, as much as it does from money or asset consideration received on an
express borrowing for which the debt is issued. Expressed as the "net
effect" theory, indirect and direct borrowing have the same economic
"net effect," and the borrowed funds are "consumed" in both cases caus-
ing a loss of basis therein. That basis, therefore, cannot be used a second
time to offset the gain from debt discharge. Thus the view of "transac-
tional equity," originating under the tax benefit rule, is extended to debt-
discharge cases in order to prevent an impermissible double-benefit.
Debt-discharge income is present under both a strict "freeing of assets"
view, or under the transactional view.
62. The Court of Appeals suggested it was done to obtain the tax advantage of an interest
deduction. See 848 F. 2d at 1237.
63. Also ignored is the "net effect" argument: similar to the reconstruction of events in Rail
Joint and Bradford, the reorganization had the same economic effect as a sale of the bonds for cash
and a redemption of the preferred stock with the cash. Both transactions leave the taxpayer without
the borrowed cash and with bonds outstanding, giving rise to income when redeemed for less than
par. The fact that a tax-deferred transaction (the reorganization) has been reconstructed as a taxable
transaction does not obviate the fact that the two are economic equivalents, and, with respect to the
redemption of the bonds at less than par value, should give the same tax effect.
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Also, especially in the business context, making a tax law distinction
between direct and indirect borrowing despite the economic identity of
the two, gives an unwarranted option to avoid tax, especially during in-
flationary periods when interest rates are rising.
Hence, whether from the viewpoint of a "net worth" analysis, or
notions of economic reality and proper tax policy, the "increase in asset
value" rationale should be discarded.

